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U.S. Congressional Committee Hearings on 
Korea during the 113th Congress 2013–2014: 
Overseeing Multifaceted Aspects of Washington’s 
Peninsular Interests
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Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA
Numerous U.S. government agencies are involved in developing and implementing
U.S. policy toward Korean Peninsula events, trends, and developments. Those
studying U.S. government policies toward this region need to pay particular 
attention to the role played by U.S. Congressional committees in this policymaking.
Congressional committees are responsible for approving new legislation, revising
existing legislation, funding U.S. government programs and conducting oversight of
these programs. This work examines Congressional committee hearings and debate
during the 113th Congress (2013–2014) and reveals that multiple Congressional
committees with varying jurisdictions seek to shape U.S. government Korean
Peninsula policy and that this policymaking covers more than international relations
and international security issues.
Keywords: U.S. Congress, Congressional committee hearings, legislative oversight,
U.S.-Korean relations, national security, international relations, economics, trade,
human rights
Introduction
U.S. government foreign and national security policymaking toward individual coun-
tries is primarily associated with executive branch agencies such as the Departments
of State and Defense, and to a lesser extent with the Departments of Commerce,
Energy, and Treasury, along with agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency
and National Security Council. Any comprehensive and substantive assessment of
U.S. foreign and national security policy toward countries such as North and South
Korea, however, must also incorporate the role played in this policymaking by the U.S.
Congress, with particular emphasis on the multifaceted and sometimes contradictory
roles played by Congressional committees.
The origins of the roles played by congress and Congressional committees in
foreign and national security policymaking originate with the drafting of the U.S.
Constitution in 1787 and subsequent ratification process lasting until 1790 which
* E-mail: chapmanb@purdue.edu
ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online
© 2016 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
http://www.kida.re.kr/kjda
has produced ongoing and often contentious debate during the subsequent 225
years.1 The U.S. Constitution grants Congress significant foreign policy and national
security policymaking powers in terms of Article 1, Sections 7–8, including:
• Legislation for raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives;
• The power to override presidential vetoes requires two-thirds of the members of
the House of Representatives and Senate agreeing to override;
• Collecting taxes, duties, excises, and imposts;
• Providing for the common defense;
• Borrowing money on U.S. credit;
• Regulating commerce with foreign nations;
• Defining and punishing piracies committed on the high seas and offenses against
international law;
• Declaring war, granting letters of marque and reprisal, and making rules concerning
land and water captures;
• Raising and supporting armies and navies, but not providing funding for more
than two years;
• Making rules governing and regulating land and naval forces.2
In addition, Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution covering presidential powers gives
the President the power to negotiate treaties with foreign countries, but requires two-
thirds of the U.S. Senate to approve or ratify these treaties to agree to their imple-
mentation and this same section also requires the U.S. Senate to confirm or agree to
presidential nominations of ambassadors to foreign countries. Throughout U.S. history
there have been numerous instances when Congress has played an important role in
blocking, defeating, or significantly modifying presidential foreign policy objectives.3
These constitutional provisions, differences in policymaking objectives between
presidential administrations and members of Congress, and the desires of individual
Congressional policymakers to personally influence Korean Peninsula policymaking
by the United States has influenced and continues influencing Washington’s rela-
tionships with Seoul and even Pyongyang. Significant scholarly analyses abound of
these Congressional attempts to sculpt Korean Peninsula policymaking by the United
States.4
Since Congress is responsible for approving new legislation, revising existing
legislation, funding government programs, and conducting oversight of government
program performance, Congressional committee hearings are an extremely valuable
resource for understanding U.S. foreign and national security policymaking toward
Korean Peninsula matters. These committees also may require agencies to prepare
an often onerous variety of reports for Congress as part of their oversight activities.
Examples of Congressionally mandated reports on Korean topics for the 113th Con-
gress include one on reducing the threat of North Korean long-range ballistic missiles;
one assuring that Korean Peninsula Energy Development Program funds are not used
for North Korean nuclear weapons development; and tariff and non-tariff barriers
imposed by South Korea on U.S. exports.5 A work documenting the importance of
Congressional information resources makes the following observation:
Committees are the instruments through which Congress chooses to screen and
process proposals to change public policy. A committee decision to hold hearings,
except for the annual appropriations and budget process, indicates that a matter has
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crossed the threshold of political salience. These proceedings serve to focus public
and political attention and may be a prelude or an alternative to legislation.6
This work examines Congressional committee hearings and debates on Korea Peninsula
topics during the 113th Congress (2013–2014) as a way of examining this region’s
economic, geopolitical, and strategic importance to the United States, Some Korean
Peninsula Congressional committee hearings will be held annually such as the Defense
Department’s budget request for Pacific Command (PACOM) whose areas of respon-
sibility include Korea and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Other Congressional hearings
held on Korean Peninsula topics may be event-driven as evidenced by a House Foreign
Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific hearing on January 13,
2016 entitled “The U.S. Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Provocations.” Hearing
topics are determined on the initiative of Congressional committee and subcommittee
chairs. Most Congressional committee hearing transcripts eventually become publicly
accessible. They will include testimony from witnesses who are experts on the subject
area being examined by Congressional committees from U.S. government agencies,
the U.S. military, academic experts, economic experts such as business personnel,
and foreign nationals, and even average citizens as one case chronicled later in this
article will demonstrate. These witnesses are invited to testify by these committees
and committee members and their professional staff strive to achieve a balance of
viewpoints presented by the witnesses. Witnesses provide sworn testimony to these
committees as if they were testifying in a court of law. Under U.S. criminal law 
contained in Title 18 of the United States Code (USC), it is a felony to provide fake,
fictitious, or fraudulent statements before U.S. government agencies, including 
Congressional committees, subject to financial fines up to five years imprisonment
for each time such offense occurs. The Federal Digital System (FDsys) of the United
States Government Publishing Office has been searched for Congressional committee
hearings in which the word “Korea” appeared somewhere within the hearing transcript
during the 113th Congress.7
The following chart lists the number of publicly accessible Congressional com-
mittee hearings during this Congressional session in which “Korea” was found as
the key subject of the hearing or was mentioned somewhere in the hearing transcript.
Most House and Senate Select Committee on intelligence hearing transcripts are not
publicly accessible for understandable national security and personal identification
protection reasons.
These figures indicate a strong plurality of these hearings cover foreign policy and
military matters and were conducted by the House and Senate Armed Services and
Foreign Affairs/Relations Committees. However, many other Congressional committees
have jurisdiction over issues affecting U.S. relations with North and South Korea. For
instance, Congressional veterans affairs committees have jurisdiction over Korean
War Veterans missing in action, bodily remains, and recovery matters; Congressional
appropriations committees are responsible for funding U.S. programs affecting Korean
Peninsula policy; the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees have
jurisdiction over international trade matters; and many other committees conduct
oversight in areas such as human rights, international economic policy, intellectual
property, science and technology policy, and terrorism which can impact U.S. relations
with North and South Korea.8
Subsequent sections of this work document selected 113th Congress Korean
Peninsula committee hearings covering national security, international relations,
economics and trade, and human rights. An additional section will document travel
to South Korea by Representatives and Senators along with Congressional support
staff.
National Security
The six decades since the Korean War, the multiple factors causing this conflict,10
and the ongoing presence of U.S. troops in South Korea due to the conventional and
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Table 1. Chart of Hearings Featuring Content on Korea during 113th Congress Encompassing
January 3, 2013–December 16, 2014 with Periodic Recesses.9
Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe 10
Congressional Executive Commission on China 5
House Administration Committee 1
House Agriculture Committee 4
House Appropriations Committee 20
House Armed Services Committee 73
House Budget Committee 2
House Education & Workforce Committee 6
House Energy & Commerce Committee 17
House Financial Services Committee 7
House Foreign Affairs Committee 109
House Judiciary Committee 4
House Natural Resources Committee 6
House Oversight & Government Reform Committee 11
House Select Intelligence Committee 0
House Science Space & Technology Committee 16
House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee 6
House Veterans Affairs Committee 17
House Ways & Means Committee 2
Senate Agriculture Committee 2
Senate Appropriations Committee 41
Senate Armed Services Committee 27
Senate Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs Committee 10
Senate Budget Committee 3
Senate Commerce, Science, & Transportation Committee 17
Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee 11
Senate Environment & Public Works Committee 1
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 49
Senate Finance Committee 12
Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee 4
Senate Select Intelligence Committee 3
Senate Judiciary Committee 2
Senate Veterans Affairs Committee 11 
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nuclear security threat from North Korea remain continuing sources for Congressional
committee oversight and assessment of this enduring national and international security
issue. During a March 20, 2013 House Homeland Security Committee hearing, Rep.
Patrick Meehan (R-PA) noted that North Korea has been an increased source of nuclear
weapons rhetoric, that Pyongyang’s cyber capability should not be underestimated
and its intent is difficult to assess, and noted recent denial of service attacks on South
Korean banking and communications entities.11 During this same hearing witness
Ilan Berman of the American Foreign Policy Council said that Iran could easily
acquire cyber war capabilities from North Korea and that Tehran had already received
North Korean assistance on ballistic missile and nuclear weapons development.12
A May 8, 2014 hearing before this same committee saw Congressional Electro-
magnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission member Peter Vincent Pry noting that Pyongyang
may have practiced an EMP attack against the United States with its KSM-3 satellite
which passed over the U.S. heartland and the Washington, D.C.-New York corridor
in April 2013 when Kim Jong Un threatened nuclear strikes against the United
States He also noted that North Korea has incorporated EMP attack into its military
doctrine.13
The March 25, 2014 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the proposed
budget for U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) saw
testimony presented by PACOM Commander Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III and
USFK commander General Mike Scaparrotti describing the Korean Peninsula security
environment and North Korean threat assessment. Locklear noted an increasingly
dangerous and unpredictable North Korea, Kim Jong Un’s purge of his uncle Chang
Song Taek, frequent military commander reshuffling as indicating regime instability,
and noting that Pyongyang remains Washington’s most dangerous and enduring
challenge.14
Scaparrotti assured this committee that the United States and South Korea are
capable and ready to deter and respond North Korean threats while referencing the
March 26, 2010 killing of 46 South Korean sailors on the corvette Cheonan by a
North Korean torpedo. He went on to warn that North Korea has the fourth-largest
army in the world with 70 percent of its ground forces deployed along the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ), and that its long-range artillery can strike targets in the Seoul metro-
politan area where over 23 million South Koreans and 50,000 Americans live. He
added that the United States is working with South Korea to develop local capabilities
in areas such as command, control, computers, communications, and intelligence
systems, an alliance counter-missile defense strategy, purchasing precision-guided
munitions, ballistic missile defense systems, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms.15
A key characteristic of Congressional hearings can be rhetorical pushback from
committee members; particularly those from the political party opposing the incumbent
presidential administration. This was reflected in this hearing by Senator James
Inhofe (R-OK) noting the erratic behavior of Kim Jong Un, China declaring air
defense identification zones, making provocative moves to block ships, and claiming
sovereignty over significant areas of the South China Sea. Inhofe also noted that
Beijing’s defense budget was growing 12 percent while then U.S. Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel had told military commanders that U.S. air, sea, and space
dominance could no longer be taken for granted. Inhofe also warned that a U.S.
retreat from this area would embolden further North Korean aggressiveness and
wanted Scaparrotti to tell the committee about readiness problems adversely affecting
U.S. and South Korean combat capabilities.16 Scaparrotti went on to tell Senator Joe
Donnelly (D-IN) that North Korea is investing in asymmetric capabilities, including
cyber to disrupt services and websites, and that their capabilities in this arena are
growing. Scaparrotti also informed Senator John McCain (R-AZ) that fewer U.S.
Army units in South Korea were operationally ready and that the high intensity
nature of Korean Peninsula combat and time and space factors involved in timely
delivery of U.S. forces to such combat concerned him. In addition, Senator Kelly
Ayotte (R-NH) stressed the critical importance of investing in missile defense to protect
South Koreans, U.S. troops, and restraining North Korean weapons proliferation.17
The continuing challenge of providing sufficient funding for U.S. military forces
in Korea and elsewhere, at a time when all U.S. government spending faces significant
constraints, was reflected in a May 8, 2013 House Armed Services Committee hearing
on the defense budget. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs
Madelyn R. Creedon contended that President Obama recognized the growing ballistic
missile threat to the United States from North Korea and other countries by having
the Defense Department add 14 new ground missile defense interceptors and that
Transportable Radar Surveillance would be deployed to Japan to provide enhanced
early warning and tracking of any missile launched by North Korea toward Japan or
the United States.18
However, Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL) expressed concern that Chinese and North
Korean modernization developments would lead the United States to increase its
regional defense spending, voiced displeasure over Secretary of State John Kerry’s
comments to China that if Beijing helped restrain North Korean behavior that it
could result in the United States withdrawing some of its regional security assets,
and admonished that the United States should not “hold its breath” waiting for
Pyongyang to demilitarize and dismantle its nuclear weapons.19
Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) noted a public intelligence community national
intelligence estimate that a North Korean ICBM attack could come as early as 2015,
criticized the Obama administration’s decision to reduce the capabilities of the Fort
Greely, Alaska, ballistic missile defense site, and chastised the Obama administration
in an April 17, 2013 letter to the President for consistently underfunding missile
defense, using national security as a gambling chip, and following the failed Russian
reset policy by allowing China and Russia to have approval of U.S. homeland missile
defense policy.20
International Relations
A March 5, 2013 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing addressed how North
Korea finances its criminal activities. The hearing was chaired by Rep. Edward Royce
(R-CA) who noted Pyongyang’s efforts to build nuclear weapons programs in Syria
and Iran, that North Korea manufactures and traffics in methamphetamine, counterfeits
hundreds of billions, has been called the “Soprano State,” and that the United States
needs to do more than rely on China to disable North Korean activities.21
One witness testifying at this hearing was David Asher of the Center for a New
American Security who had also served as a former senior advisor for the State Depart-
ment’s East Asian and Pacific Affairs division and North Korea Working Group
90 Bert Chapman
Korea during the 113th U.S. Congress: 2013–2014 91
Coordinator. Asher mentioned that on September 1, 2012, North Korea signed a 
scientific cooperation agreement with Iran comparable to a 2002 agreement with
Syria and that Iranians attending this ceremony included the Minister of Industry,
Mines, and Trade, the Defense Minister, and the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy
Organization. Asher subsequently expressed the need for the United States, South
Korea, and Japan to take a more urgent and aggressive approach toward North
Korea maintaining:
It is time to stop the complacency on countering, containing and disrupting North
Korea’s proliferation machinery and the malevolent regime before serious and enduring
damage occurs to global security. Working closely with our allies, especially those
on the front lines in South Korea and Japan, we need to organize and commence a
global program of comprehensive action targeting Pyongyang’s proliferation apparatus,
its facilitators, its partners, agents, proxies, its overseas presence. We need to interfere
and sabotage decisively with their nuclear and missile programs. We also need to
revive an initiative identifying and targeting the Kim regime’s financial lifelines,
including its illicit sources of revenue and overseas financial nest egg bank accounts,
especially in China. Chinese banks and trading companies who continue to illegally
facilitate access for North Korea, themselves, should be targeted. Finally, the United
States should commence a program to influence the internal workings of the North
Korean regime to undermine the Kim dynasty, and ultimately lay the groundwork
for a change in regime if it doesn’t change course fundamentally. Bringing about
change in North Korea will require a top-down, determined effort across the whole
of government and among a league of willing foreign partners similar to the initiative
that I had the opportunity to run during the Bush administration.22
Another witness at this hearing was Korean Studies professor Sung-Yoon Lee from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He noted that North
Korea is the world’s only example of an industrialized, urbanized, literate, and peacetime
economy to suffer famine and that despite being a cultish isolated country it has the
world’s largest military in terms of manpower defense spending proportional to
national income. This produces an abnormal state capable of exerting disproportionate
regional influence through external provocations and internal repression and that it
will not make nuclear and missile program concessions unless confronted with a
credible existential threat to regime survival.23
Lee went on to advocate the following policy options against Pyongyang:
The United States Treasury Department should declare the entire North Korean
Government a primary money laundering concern. This would allow Treasury to
require U.S. banks to take precautionary special measures substantially restricting
foreign individuals, banks, and entities from gaining access to the U.S. financial system.
Treasury could also apply these measures to third-country business partners that
finance the Kim regime, and Pyongyang’s shadowy economy. And the the United
States should also ask allied governments to apply corresponding measures to third-
country banks, businesses, and nationals doing business with North Korea. Moreover,
the United States should expand the designation of prohibited activity to include those
furthering North Korea’s proliferation, illicit activities, import of luxury goods, cash
transactions in excess of $10,000, lethal military equipment transactions, and the
perpetration of crimes against humanity. North Korea is the world’s leading candidate
for indictment for crimes against humanity. Such measures would effectively debilitate
—present the North Korean regime with a credible threat that would far surpass
what took place against Banco Delta Asia in 2005.24
Lee also excoriated South Korea for giving North Korea cash, food, and fertilizer and
over $10 billion in aid during a ten-year period as part of Seoul’s “Sunshine Policy.”
He also noted the approximately $20 million per year that Pyongyang generates
from the Kaesong Industrial Complex joint venture with South Korea and the nearly
$1 billion North Korea receives annually from China.25
A March 4, 2014 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing dealt extensively
with the status of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia. East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee Chair Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) noted that 2013 marked the
60th anniversary of the U.S.-South Korean alliance and President Park Geun-hye’s
address to a joint session of Congress, the 2012 signing of the U.S.-South Korea Free
Trade Agreement, Seoul’s interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, South Korea recently
agreeing to share defense costs of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, bilateral coop-
eration on clean energy, and supporting the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.26
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel
told the subcommittee “the alliance between the United States and the Republic of
Korea is the lynchpin of stability and security in Northeast Asia. Our alliance with
South Korea was forged in shared sacrifice in the Korean War, and it continues to
anchor security on the Peninsula.” Russel went on to stress the critical importance of
cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States, while also expressing
concern about friction between Tokyo and Seoul, the need for these problems to be
resolved, and the critical importance of bipartisan Congressional cooperation and
cooperation from Japan and South Korean legislatures in building and sustaining
these ties.27
Cardin also asked witness Michael Auslin from the American Enterprise Institute
what could be done to ameliorate distrust between Japan and South Korea with Auslin
replying:
I think there comes a time where we, given our commitments to both of these coun-
tries, need to be extraordinarily blunt and have a real heart-to-heart talk, so to speak,
with both of them about the problems this is causing. And I would argue, quite
frankly, that our patience is not infinite; that, to the degree that this makes our job
harder for them, then they need to not only think about what that might ultimately
cause, in terms of the ability of the United States to fulfill its commitments, but also
how we may rethink what is in our own best interests.28
Economics and Trade
Economic and trade policy is also a critically important factor in the bilateral relation-
ship between Seoul and Washington and is also a central topic in many Congressional
hearings on U.S. relations with South Korea. Table 2 illustrates the volume of U.S.
imports from and exports to South Korea during 2013–2014 and the size of the U.S.
trade deficit with South Korea, ranking as America’s sixth-largest trading partner.29
Congressional hearings on trade between Seoul and Washington during the
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113th Congress focused on various positive aspects and irritants. During a May 8,
2014 Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee hearing, U.S. Travel
Association President Roger Dow noted that adding South Korea to the U.S. Visa
Waiver Program in 2008 saw the number of South Koreans visiting the U.S. increase
to 1.3 million; their spending in the United States increasing by 52 percent between
2008 and 2012 reaching a total of $4.2 billion; South Korean spending in the United
States during 2012 supporting 36,200 U.S. jobs; and travel becoming the 5th-largest
U.S. export to South Korea, representing 7 percent of total U.S. exports to that country.
Testimony during this hearing also showed that extending the Visa Waiver Program
increased the number of South Korean visitors to Hawaii from 38,110 to 171,506
between 2008–2012 with their expenditures rising from $79.4 million to $314.6 
million between 2008–2013.31
A July 29, 2014 Senate Finance Committee subcommittee hearing on the second
anniversary of the U.S.-Korean free trade agreement saw appreciation expressed for
South Korea as an ally and partner while expressing concern about remaining challenges
in the bilateral trading relationship articulated by then subcommittee chair Senator
Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) in these comments:
. . . for trade deals to thrive, they must be a win-win for both sides. So far, the Korean
free trade agreement has fallen short of our hopes. The agreement aimed to narrow
the trade deficit between the United States and Korea. Instead, the trade deficit has
gone in the wrong direction. Even if you look at the most conservative numbers, that
deficit has grown. If you look at the deficit in goods, in the things that we make, it
has increased by nearly 50 percent. While our dairy producers have reaped many
benefits through the trade agreement, they continue to face challenges when it comes
to certain products that are blocked from the market based on geographical indications.
We will hear more about that today from our witnesses. The agreement aimed to
open Korea’s markets to American automakers, but agreeing to phase out tariffs on
U.S.-made automobiles has not been enough. Due to non-tariff barriers, Korea remains
one of the most closed auto markets in the world. Given our strong alliance with the
Republic of Korea, I am hopeful that the expectations we had at the outset will be
matched by real-world results, but to achieve these results we must have candid 
conversations about what is working and what is not, and that is why we are here.32
Committee member Senator Johnny Isakson (R-GA) presented a more positive assess-
ment of this trade pact. He noted this agreement benefitted Georgia with increased
aerospace products, pulp and paper, engines and turbines, and agricultural and chemical
product exports totaling nearly $800 million from Georgia to South Korea. He went
on to contend that South Korean investment in Georgia sees that state house 62
Korean companies and facilities with 23 of these being manufacturing facilities. He
Table 2. Volume of U.S. Imports from and Exports to South Korea during 2013–2014 and
the Size of the U.S. Trade Deficit with South Korea30
U.S. Imports U.S. Exports U.S. Trade Deficit
2013 $62,433.2 billion $41,686.6 billion $20,746.6 billion
2014 $69,518.4 billion $44,471.4 billion $25,047.1 billion
2015 (thru November) $66,440.7 billion $40,108.0 billion $26,332.7 billion 
also cited the Kia Motors manufacturing plant in West Point, GA as a $1.1 billion
investment providing direct or indirect jobs for over 10,000 Georgians and pointed
out that on July 11, 2013 the one-millionth Kia car was built in the United States at
this plant.33
Continuing concern over South Korean non-tariff barriers was expressed by Ford
Motor Company Vice-President for International Governmental Affairs Stephen
Biegun who warned that with a market penetration rate of just over five percent South
Korea ranked last among 32 OECD member countries in terms of import access. He
contended that South Korea had the most closed auto import market in the world,
expressed concern about the nature of upcoming Korean market rules for exporting
cars to that country, and expressed frustration with Korean government currency
manipulation.34
An April 3, 2014 House Agriculture Committee hearing saw Secretary of Agri-
culture Tom Vilsack express general approval with the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade
Agreement noting that it opened the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to U.S.
potato exports producing a 13 percent rise in this commodity’s export to these countries
reaching nearly $21 million. However, concern that rice was excluded from this
agreement was expressed by Rep. Rick Crawford (R-AR) whose state is a major rice
producer with its 2014 production covering 1,480,000 acres representing over 50
percent of U.S. rice production.35
Human Rights
Concern over human rights conditions in foreign countries has also been a hallmark
characteristic of Congressional oversight of bilateral U.S. relations with countries
such as South Korea and North Korea with Congress requiring the State Department
to prepare annual reports on country human rights conditions and Congress regularly
preparing legislation affecting the financial and security assistance the United States
provides to other countries.36
Congressional concern with Korean Peninsula human rights conditions has covered
both South and North Korea with the conditions in the South being a particular area
of Congressional emphasis before Seoul’s democratization in the late 1980s.37 The
continuing persistence of atrocious human rights conditions in North Korea, which
received visible international documentation in a 2013 United Nations Human Rights
Council report on this dynastic Stalinist regime, now characterizes U.S. Congressional
human rights concerns with North Korea.38
During an April 29, 2014 House Foreign Affairs Committee subcommittee hearing
on human trafficking, Subcommittee Chair Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ) noted that nearly
90 percent of North Korean women seeking asylum in China are trafficked for brides,
labor, and sex. He noted that China’s response has not been to provide protection to
these women or prosecute their traffickers under the 1951 United Nations Refugee
Convention, but instead repatriating North Koreans and sending them back to face hard
labor, lengthy imprisonments, and potential execution. Smith concluded that because
of China’s one-child policy, by 2020 more than 20 million Chinese men will be unable
to find Chinese wives and that sex-selective abortions in China have produced a
gigantic trafficking magnet pulling victims into forced marriages and brothels from
countries adjacent to China and beyond.39
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A June 18, 2014 hearing by this subcommittee featured testimony from South
Korean Ambassador-at-Large for Human Rights Lee Jong Hoon. The ambassador
shared the international frustration felt by many toward the sluggish international
response to North Korean human rights practices asserting:
What will it take for the international community to finally say no more to the North
Korean regime? Why can’t there be a red line for human rights as there is for
weapons of mass destruction? In a normal state, national security is pursued to ensure
human security. In North Korea, however, national security ensures only regime
security. The state takes no responsibility to protect its own people. It is no wonder
why North Koreans en masse resort to taking refuge across the border. Why?
Because there is no hope in a country ruled by political prisons, torture, hunger, and
public execution, completely void of the fundamental rights to an adequate standard
of living, not to mention life. The question remains how to get at the main sole
source of all problems—the Pyongyang regime itself.40
Particularly vivid and compelling personal testimony on the horrific North Korean
human rights situation was provided by Shin Dong Hyuk, who escaped a North Korean
prison camp in 2005 and arrived in South Korea the following year. He praised 
the United States, the European Union, and other countries for passing resolutions
critical of Pyongyang’s human rights practices but criticized South Korea’s National
Assembly for its failure to pass a comparable resolution. He provided excruciating
details of his ordeal in this system including seeing his mother and brother being
publicly executed in front of other prisoners for talking about escaping, being tortured
by guards tying his feet in metal shackles, hanging him upside down, and torturing
him by hanging him over a burning fire pit. A concluding description of his experience
includes the following observations:
These vestiges of my suffering will never go away until the day I die. The prison
guards in the prison camps think of the human prisoners inmates as worth less than
animals. The cruelest and most excruciating method of treating the prisoners, pun-
ishing the prisoners, is by denying them food and starving them. And if a prisoner
does not work well or fails to meet a work quota they are punished by the prison
guards. However, before the punishment is carried out the prisoners are given a
choice by the prison guards either by getting beaten or having our meal or food
taken away, denied from us. And in my case, going hungry and being denied food
was a suffering and pain beyond my imagination so thus I chose the punishment of
getting beaten. And the reason why I say this today is that even now as I speak
before you in this chamber there are still babies being born like I was born in the
prison camp. There are still people who are getting killed by public executions in the
camp and are dying from starvation and beatings in the prison camps right this
moment.41
Commenting on Shin’s criticism of the refusal of South Korea’s National Assembly’s
refusal to criticize North Korean human rights, Ambassador Andrew Natsios of the
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea noted:
This is a very odd situation but South Korean politics is unusual. The conservatives
in South Korea are the ones that press the human rights issue. The Korean left, left of
center, do not. They believe it compromises the ability of the South Korean government
to negotiate with the North Korean government. So they don’t raise those issues.
Human rights in North Korea is a highly political issue in South Korean politics.
Here, you have bipartisan support among Republicans and Democrats on many human
rights issues. That is not the case in South Korea with respect to North Korea. It is
changing among younger people. There is a shift of opinion I noticed when I was
there a couple of years ago. But right now there is not going to be any court, I have
to tell you. There is a reason Mr. Shin just told us that the South Korean parliament
has not had any hearings on this issue. There is no legislation that has gone through.
The Ministry of Reunification does have a small unit that deals with North Korea human
rights issues. However, because of the divisiveness of this issue in South Korean
politics it is not at the forefront. President Park did make a very strong statement
but, again, that is not usual.42
Congressional Travel to South Korea During 113th Congress
Members of Congress may also travel to foreign countries as part of their oversight
responsibilities in Congressional Delegations (CODELS) to gain enhanced knowledge
of the situation in these countries and to meet with and build relationships with relevant
governmental policymakers including fellow legislators. These trips can be useful in
enhancing Congressional knowledge of local trends and developments, but they can
also be criticized as taxpayer-funded “junkets” involving insufficient time in the
country to meet with local officials and gain substantive understanding of situations
in these countries.43
During the 113th Congress, 42 Representatives and 10 Senators visited South
Korea and many of them were accompanied by their professional staff or the staff of
relevant Congressional oversight committees. Bipartisan examples of Representatives
visiting South Korea as part of the 113th Congress CODELS include House Armed
Services, Budget, and Foreign Affairs Committee Chairs Reps. Howard McKeon 
(R-CA), Paul Ryan (R-WI), and Edward Royce (R-CA) and Reps. Tulsi Gabbard
(D-HI), Grace Meng (D-NY), and Brad Sherman (D-CA) who served on the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. Senators visiting South Korea during this period included
Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who
chaired this entity’s Subcommittee on Asian-Pacific Affairs, then Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chair Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), this committee’s
ranking member (now chair) Senator Bob Corker (R-TN), Armed Services Committee
member (now chair) Senator John McCain (R-AZ), and Foreign Relations and Select
Intelligence Committee member and 2016 presidential candidate Senator Marco
Rubio (R-FL).44
Conclusion
Understanding the U.S. Congress’ constitutionally mandated role to fund government
programs, including those involving foreign and military affairs and intelligence
operations, creating new and revise existing foreign legislation, regulating international
trade, and conducting oversight of relevant U.S. government programs in these areas
is critically important for foreign scholars and audiences studying U.S. international
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relations and security policy. This importance is demonstrated by U.S. Representatives
and Senators being directly elected by the public and representing, at least to some
extent, public opinion on international relations and security issues.
While Congressional committee hearings can contain examples of rhetorical
political grandstanding by Representatives and Senators and by witnesses, they are
also critically important resources for understanding foreign policy, human rights,
international economics, and international security topics and how Congressional
policymaking in these areas works successfully or fails. These hearings can expand
public knowledge and affect U.S. policy toward Korean Peninsula issues depending on
media coverage, potential positive or negative impacts Korean economic developments
may have on individual U.S. states and Congressional districts, and the willingness
of Congress to pressure presidential administrations to implement policy changes
through legislation or using the “power of the purse” to affect governmental program
funding. Koreans and other international scholars and students of U.S. foreign, human
rights, international economic, and national security policy need to use these generally
freely available resources to effectively lobby and influence relevant Congressional
committee members and professional staff to ensure South Korean economic and
security interests are considered by Congress. These individuals should also take
advantage of the availability of these hearings, including video webcasts, to gain an
enhanced understanding of how Congress and the executive branch carry out the
ongoing development and implementation of U.S. foreign, human rights, international
economic, and security policies toward the Korean Peninsula and other global regions.45
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